Today the relevance of ancient military history to modern warfare and strategic theory is a question not often posed 1 More specific points can also be cited: first, the history of sieges, the oldest form of total war, suggests that neither technological advances nor the democratic revolution influenced the characteristic lack of distinction between combatants and noncombatants; second, inventions such as the tank changed the pace and appearance of modern campaigns without altering the nature of battle; and third, although the means of command vary with technology, the functions of command do not, and improved technology does not necessarily yield a better command structure 6 . According to this school of thought only the face and not the character of war changes with technology; strong threads of continuity are thickly woven within its basic fabric. For the historian of ancient military affairs the problems of change and continuity in the history of warfare present a dilemma. How can the ancient military historian recapture the essence of Greek and Roman military operations? Is it possible to find a suitable basis of comparison between ancient and modern warfare and, if so, would the degree of continuity thus proven not permit some assertion of the continued relevance of ancient military history to the study of war? The school of change, however, occupies a strong position, since the rejection of ancient military history as the result of technological advances cannot be easily denied. In contrast, the school of continuity often offers plausible but highly subjective interpretations on isolated points. An explicit, detailed, and objective case for continuity has never been presented. The following study seeks, first, to work out a methodology providing a suitable basis of comparison between ancient and modern warfare -one avoiding the hurdle of technological change, while demonstrating the case for continuity -and, second, to offer a modest plea for the continued relevance of the study of ancient military history. The historian of ancient military affairs is, after all, the practitioner of an historical genre once highly venerated and thought of the greatest practical application, but now relegated to the clois-7 MGM 1/88 ters of academe or diluted into popularization.
in published works surfaced already in the nineteenth century. The philosopher of modern war par excellence, Carl von Clausewitz, rejected use of historical examples from ancient history, as did Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, an English disciple of the Swiss interpreter of Napoleonic warfare Antoine Henri Jomini. For these theorists ancient history could no longer be profitably applied: the sources were too obscure and scanty for proper analysis of events and the means and organization of armies had changed too much 4 . In brief, this attitude supposes that changes in technology eliminate the relevance of ancient military history for understanding the modern phenomenon of war. Yet another view is also possible. Despite the desires and arguments of pacifists and moralists, war has been a constant in history. Few would dispute that nations of the twentieth century wage war for basically the same reasons as Greeks and Romans. Indeed arguments of continuity between ancient and modern warfare can be presented to counter those stressing change. High technology and nuclear arms have not deterred one polemologist from writting that the concepts and conduct of international relations have changed little since antiquity, and another scholar has argued that technology is the only significant difference between ancient and modern views of warfare 5 .
More specific points can also be cited: first, the history of sieges, the oldest form of total war, suggests that neither technological advances nor the democratic revolution influenced the characteristic lack of distinction between combatants and noncombatants; second, inventions such as the tank changed the pace and appearance of modern campaigns without altering the nature of battle; and third, although the means of command vary with technology, the functions of command do not, and improved technology does not necessarily yield a better command structure 6 . According to this school of thought only the face and not the character of war changes with technology; strong threads of continuity are thickly woven within its basic fabric. For the historian of ancient military affairs the problems of change and continuity in the history of warfare present a dilemma. How can the ancient military historian recapture the essence of Greek and Roman military operations? Is it possible to find a suitable basis of comparison between ancient and modern warfare and, if so, would the degree of continuity thus proven not permit some assertion of the continued relevance of ancient military history to the study of war? The school of change, however, occupies a strong position, since the rejection of ancient military history as the result of technological advances cannot be easily denied. In contrast, the school of continuity often offers plausible but highly subjective interpretations on isolated points. An explicit, detailed, and objective case for continuity has never been presented. The following study seeks, first, to work out a methodology providing a suitable basis of comparison between ancient and modern warfare -one avoiding the hurdle of technological change, while demonstrating the case for continuity -and, second, to offer a modest plea for the continued relevance of the study of ancient military history. The historian of ancient military affairs is, after all, the practitioner of an historical genre once highly venerated and thought of the greatest practical application, but now relegated to the clois-7 MGM 1/88 ters of academe or diluted into popularization.
Just as other genres of history, military history has succumbed to the period specialists. Few dare anymore to cast a scholarly glance beyond their narrow niches and to catch even a glimpse of the history of war as a whole, unless of course their purpose is a brief survey volume aimed for undergraduate consumption in a college course. Indeed a noted Byzantinist has recently recognized a crisis in military historiography, in which historians now fail to ask the right questions 7 . Most contemporary scholars of Classical military history do not deviate from this pattern. Most in fact probably consider themselves exclusively ancient historians and feel little or no affinity to the field of military history which they also (perhaps unwittingly) contribute -a symptom of compartmentalization in contemporary historiography. A plea for continuity and thus relevance seems long overdue.
I
The assault on the school of change must be launched from an analysis of military historiography. When historians look at the history of war as a whole, two categories of change, apart from emphasis on the brilliance (or stupidity) of individual commanders, tend to receive the most notice: first, technology; and second, the organization of the fighting forces, which over the last two decades has come to include analysis of the social composition of armies. Technology, however, often dictates organization, for men must be placed in manageable units to exploit best the weapons at their disposal. Thus, with the exception of those surveying military history as a whole to prove the validity of a specific theory of operations, such as Liddell Hart and his indirect approach 8 , the history of warfare tends to be seen as a matter of generals, technology, and organized masses of men 9 . The actual conduct of operations, stripped of all details peculiar to the historical event under consideration, is generally thought to be governed by basic do's and don't's guaranteeing success if properly observed -the so-called principles of war. These principles are taken as a constant, although their historical validity has never been proved nor has general agreement on their number, identity, and definition ever occurred 10 .
Yet another set of rules, quite different from the principles of war, also comes into play -rules governing the intensity, ferocity, and the degree of trickery permitted in the conflict. These rules, constituting military ethics in its broadest sense as well as the customs and usages of war, might be generally characterized as an unwritten warrior code. Throughout history aspects of the unwritten warrior code have worked their way into international law, and especially since the nineteenth century humanitarian considerations converted into international conventions have attempted to limit war's ferocity 11 . Intensity and trickery, however, remain in a gray area between written rules of conduct and the unwritten warrior code. The degree of violence in war, i. e., its intensity, often functions according to the principles of escalation and reciprocity: raising the level of violence beyond that normally expected will provoke a response in kind or even retaliation at a higher level. Trickery works in much the same way, but the key to its effectiveness lies in exploitation of what is normally expected. Whereas increasing the intensity of violence almost always employs direct and open means, the trickery of stratagem manipulates the secret, the unexpected, and the underhanded. Some degree of trickery is legitimate and to be expected, but other forms of trickery provoke the outraged cries of perfidy and treachery. The border between legitimate ruse and treachery, conditioned by the warrior code dictating the expectations of the parties in a particular period, has never been and, from a practical point of view, probably never 8 can be clearly drawn. Yet trickery, a much more economic means to victory than direct escalation of violence, has greater repercussions, since it can destroy any notion of good faith between combatants with the result of both raising the level of intensity and reducing the possibilities of reconciliation between opponents.
An unwritten warrior code and the level of normal expectation it projects reflect the values of the combating parties. Warfare has always been a matter of honor. The supranational brotherhood of arms, best illustrated by medieval chivalry and which continues to affect Western military traditions even today, calls for rules and limitations on violence 12 . Yet chivalrous practice has existed in many societies at various periods, sometimes having a religious basis and often reflecting the exclusiveness of aristocracies to whom the warrior function was primarily limited 13 . The game must have rules and be played fairly. The Western heroic tradition stemming from Homer, which has had no small affect on shaping Western military traditions and thought, places a premium on honor and the use of open, direct means by which manly virtues, above all, courage, can be displayed to the fullest. In the Western view the glory of victory should not be tainted by subterfuge and ruse. Besides, trickery is not only dishonorable, but the recourse of the weak. Thus the unwritten warrior code of the West has taken Achilles as its model, but the ethos of the wily Odysseus, ever devising tricks to secure his goals, has not been forgotten despite efforts to suppress it. A certain tension exists between the two in Western military history, for the unconventional and unorthodox commander has always appeared, who remains unconvinced that the brawn of the strong rather than wit and intelligence is the best military means to an end. Of course a warrior code, like international law, only possesses validity within a group sharing common values and composing a part of the system. Rules or restraints need not apply when Greeks and Romans oppose barbarians, Christians fight infidels, or civilized nations confront heathen savages. In theory the charter of the United Nations has eliminated all such distinctions between insiders and outsiders 14 . This very schematic sketch of military historiography and the kinds of rules operating in the conduct of war is intended to add some elements of continuity in the history of war to those already mentioned. Certainly other constants could be noted, for any general must confront problems of terrain, weather, movement, and supplies. But these physical problems find their solutions in ever changing technology, whereas an unwritten warrior code, although no doubt historically conditioned by its time, reflects the traits of human behavior and attitudes fostered by a tradition passed on from generation to generation.
Factors of non-change and continuity are of the utmost importance in comparative history, especially if, as here, a comparison is to be drawn between such chronological poles as the warfare in Classical antiquity and today. We have cast the problem in terms of historiography and rules: the former, because it determines what the history is through interpretation of the raw data and the methodology used to derive that interpretation; and the latter, because rules, despite the influence of the Zeitgeist in their establishment and definition, afford a much more objective criterion for judgement than other factors involving countless variables and value judgements ,5 . Furthermore, rules of war and international law, which often represents the sanctioning of customs and unwritten rules already long in use, are not necessarily a function of technology. Our problem is not the evolution of laws of war, a question too complicated and far ranging for discussion here. We must be content to show objectively that a continuity of rules exists -the proper first step before any meaningful assessment of changes in rules can be attempted.
Comparisons of ancient and modern warfare are, of course, not new. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century the study of ancient warfare had a practical purpose 9 not only for general military education to instruct in the commander's art from the batdes of Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, but also for practical adaptation of ancient formations on the battlefield. Clausewitz, as noted earlier, reacted to these trends 16 .
Nevertheless, even when French and German armies marched off to confront each other in August 1914, both did so under classically inspired doctrines. In the mid-nineteenth century the French officer Ardant du Picq derived from a study of ancient battles that the concept of shock in combat was a myth. Success in battle was a matter of morale, since the collision of one tactical mass with another rarely occurred: either the attackers lost heart before making contact or the defenders fled. The Strategemata is clearly designed for practical use and ready reference. Frontinus provides tables of contents to each of the four books organized by stratagems to be used before, during, and after battle as well as ruses for siegecraft. More significantly, however, Frontinus draws a firm distinction between strategika and strategemata. Greek strategika as a neuter plural adjective used substantively denotes the properties of a general or generalship and in book titles military affairs in general. The word strategema first occurs in Xenophon, apparently meaning »principles or examples of generalship«, and its specific definition as »military trick« is only first secure in Philo of Byzantium at the end of the third century B. C. and in Polybius in the second century B. C. 30 .
In Greek the two words were initially synonyms. Even after strategema acquired its more specialized meaning as trick, it could still appear in some cases as the equivalent of strategika. Nevertheless, Frontinus sharply defines strategemata as a subset of strategika: strategika denote the deeds of generals done with foresight, expediency, steadfastness, restraint, and justice, but strategemata refer only to offensive or defensive acts characterized by craft and cleverness, in short, the clever deeds of generals (sollertia ducum factaJ 31 . Moreover, this distinction is scrupulously observed: books 1-3 and 4.7
contain strategemata and 4.1-6 strategika. In contrast to Frontinus very little is known about Polyaenus 32 . He apparently had followed a career in law and was too old for military service, when c. 161 Rome and Parthia began the war which occasioned his Strategika. The work is divided into eight books, each with its own dedicatory preface to the Emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, perhaps indicating that each book was published separately. Since no reference to Verus' departure for the war in spring 162 occurs until the preface to the sixth book and no allusion to the end of the war appears, the work must have been completed before 165. Polyaenus never mentions his sources and there is no proof that he used Frontinus, although the possibility that both drew on common sources cannot be de-12
nied. No tables of contents to aid quick reference are found in the Greek work, which is organized by the stratagems of individual generals and nations rather than by practical topics. Furthermore, as a Greek writing in his native tongue, Polyaenus feels no compulsion to define what he means by strategemata. The manuscript tradition is clear that the title of the work is Strategika rather than Strategemata, although titles in manuscripts can be the attribution of scribes or copyists and not of the author. In any event, Polyaenus makes no distinction between anecdotes of strategika and strategemata. This brief comparison of the only two extant stratagem collections yields that Frontinus' Strategemata rather than Polyaenus' Strategika provides the best source of ancient evidence on stratagems for our study. His collection includes anecdotes of events ranging in date from the sixth century B. C. to the first century A. D. and, more significantly, he not only rigorously defines stratagem but also scrupulously follows his definition in the organization of his work -an aspect totally lacking in Polyaenus. Furthermore, no analysis of the legality of Frontinus' stratagems by either ancient or modern standards of the laws of war has ever been attempted (although the same could be said for Polyaenus). Classicists have concerned themselves only with the authenticity of the fourth book, the historicity of specific stratagems, and Quellenforschung 33 . In contrast, modern writers on military deception (to the extent that they acknowledge at all that the concept of stratagem is not exclusively an idea of the twentieth century) pay only lip service to Frontinus 34 .
Indeed a modern writer on laws of war offers the perfect testable hypothesis for our comparison of ancient and modern warfare. According to Fleck legal considerations are marginal in Frontinus and Polyaenus and the ethics of ancient stratagems are questionable 35 . If Fleck's statement is generally true, then one would expect to find Frontinus' Strategemata full of acts violating contemporary laws of war. Thus our task becomes analysis of Frontinus' stratagems by modern standards of the laws of war. This exercise, although not completely devoid of subjective elements (as will be outlined below) presents the opportunity for a much more objective insight into how ancient and modern warfare really compare than any parallels between details of ancient and modern campaigns drawn from narrative sources could offer. Moreover, differences in technology cannot affect the results: the problem is of rules, not of means. It also seems fair to add that Frontinus' Strategemata provides an unbiased sampling of the available evidence. How in fact could he have weighted the evidence for or against twentiethcentury laws of war? Before turning to Frontinus' anecdotes, the methodology of this study should be specified. First, we proceed from the basic premise that any human act may be judged legal or illegal, ethical or unethical. Not all of the 583 anecdotes in the Strategemata raise legal or ethical issues, unless of course human cleverness and ingenuity be judged somehow unethical. In Section III we have selected for discussion only those anecdotes which arouse suspicion that they might involve violations of the modern laws of war. All other stratagems in Frontinus appear in our opinion to be legitimate ruses. Second, Frontinus' own evaluation of the legality of individual stratagems is not the point of this study. We seek a comparison of ancient and modern warfare to determine explicitly and as objectively as possible the extent of continuity in rules. Ancient practice must be judged by modern standards to achieve this goal. It cannot be argued that Frontinus viewed all the stratagems in his collection as legitimate, because he did not, and we shall discuss briefly in Section IV the kinds of stratagems of which Frontinus disapproved. Third, the modern criterion by which we shall judge Frontinus' stratagems will be the United States' standard army manual on the laws of war, The Law of Land Warfare 36 .
13 This text will be supplemented for clarifications, as needed, with other works and commentaries on international law. Use of the American manual reflects accessibility to the writer rather than ethnocentrism, and analysis of Frontinus by a British, French, German, or other national manual would probably not yield significantly different results 37 .
Fourth, the modus operandi will be as follows. A brief summary of current law outlining specific areas of infractions will be presented. Next anecdotes from Frontinus suspected of illustrating violations of current law will be discussed, grouped by categories of violations. Since Frontinus' anecdotes are composed to illustrate succinctly a particular stratagem and all pertinent details for judging a violation of the laws of war do not always appear, brief commentaries to justify classification as legitimate or illegitimate conduct will be offered. Furthermore, Frontinus' distinction of strategika from strategemata will be preserved. Hence the sample includes 484 stratagems (Strat. 1-3, 4.7) of the 583 anecdotes in the Strategemata n . Finally, the historicity of individual anecdotes is not at issue in this paper and the question will not be raised. Accordingly, parallel references from other sources to the stratagems (available elsewhere, e. g., the edition of Frontinus in the Loeb Classical Library) will not clutter the footnotes.
II
The modern law on stratagem is fairly simple: all stratagems are permitted, provided that they do not involve perfidy, treachery, or a breach of good faith, and do not violate any generally accepted rules. Spies and bribery of enemy soldiers or civilians to induce defection, rebellion, desertion, or surrender are legitimate, as are all means to mystify, mislead, and deceive the enemy. Treachery and perfidy occur, however, when a moral obligation to speak the truth is violated, such as breaches of a truce and terms of surrender, or feigning surrender then injuring one's captors, or accepting surrender and then harming the prisoners. Lying to the enemy under other circumstances is acceptable 39 .
The concept of treachery also extends to certain military conventions. Improper use of a flag of truce, the enemy's national flag, uniforms, or insignia, and the emblem of the Red Cross is prohibited. A flag of truce may not be used for intelligence gathering, to cover a retreat, or to effect surprise. »Improper use« of national flags, uniforms, and insignia generally means their employment during combat, thus permitting these in stratagems before or after combat 40 . A further prohibition connected with stratagem is the ban on treacherous killing and wounding, which applies to assassination or proscription, and conceptually also extends to the use of poison or poisoned weapons 41 .
This brief overview of the »rules of the game« is only intended to give an impression. The actual complexity of some of these rules in practice will become clearer in the discussion of violations found in Frontinus. To supplement and to clarify some of the rules, the following list includes those ruse acts specifically designated war crimes: use of poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms, treacherous request for quarter, maltreatment of dead bodies, hostilities against undefended localities or those of no military significance, abuse of or hostilities against a flag of truce, misuse of the Red Cross emblem, use of civilian clothing by troops during combat, improper use of privileged buildings for military purposes, poisoning wells or streams, pillage or purposeless destruction, and violation of surrender terms 42 .
III
The following anecdotes from Frontinus' Strategemata arouse suspicion that they involve violations of modern laws of war, although some of the apparent breaches of law occur in the anecdotes without being integral parts of the stratagem. Thus in some cases the violations have nothing to do with whether the stratagem itself is illegal. 
Misuse of the Enemy's Uniform, Insignia, and Flag

2.5.10:
In a war against the Illyrians Alexander of Epirus lured his foes into an ambush by dressing some of his men in Illyrian costumes and having them ravage some Epirote territory. The real Illyrians followed suit with their supposed countrymen and were led into the trap. Date unknown.
2.5.15:
The Chians during a war with the Erythraeans killed an Erythraean spy on a high peak and dressed a Chian in his clothes, who signaled to the Erythraeans and seduced them into an ambush. Date unknown. 2.9.9: Peisistratus the Athenian surprised a Megarian fleet which had come to Eleusis by night to kidnap Athenian women during a sacrifice. He then manned the Megarian 16 ships with Athenian soldiers, dressed a few women as captives, and sailed to Megara, where the Megarians, deceived by appearances, were defeated a second time. c. 600 B. C.
2.9.10:
Cimon, the Athenian general, deceived the Persians at the battle of the Eurymedon by approaching their camp in Persian ships and with his men dressed in Persian equipment, which had been taken in another battle with the Persians on the same day. 466 B. C.
3.2.4:
When the Arcadians were besieging a fortress of the Messenians, they made weapons resembling those of their opponents. Later they learned that the besieged expected reenforcements, so the Arcadians dressed their men to resemble the attire of the relief force, gained admission to the fortress, and thus captured it by force. Date unknown.
3.2.11:
Timarchus, an Aetolian, killed the Ptolemic general Charmades and dressed himself in the dead man's cloak and helmet. In this fashion he was admitted to the harbor of the Sanii and got possession of it. c. 280 B. C.
3.14.1:
The Spanish city of Ategua controlled by Pompey's partisans was besieged by the Caesarians. A Moor wanted to lead reenforcements into the city through the Caesarian lines. By pretending to be a Caesarian officer he acquired the password from one outpost and used it to get through the others. 45 B. C.
4.7.12:
Marcus Portius Cato, after capturing some Carthaginian ships, distributed the enemy's weapons and insignia among his own men. Thus he was able to deceive and sink other enemy ships. Date unknown.
4.7.23:
Iphicrates, the Athenian general, wishing to test the loyalty of a certain town, equipped his own fleet in the fashion of the enemy and sailed there. When the fleet was greeted with enthusiasm, the town's treachery was discovered and Iphicrates sacked the place. At some point 390-389 B. C.
Classification of ancient stratagems under this category would initially seem rather difficult, since uniforms and national flags are usually seen as developments of the early modern period, and use of an enemy's weapons and ships does not constitute a violation of the laws of war, provided of course that the ships do not fly the enemy's flag in combat 45 . A closer examination of Frontinus' language, however, reveals that national costumes could serve the same function as the modern uniform, especially for deception, although with the exception of 3.2.11 specific details of the costumes (whether helmets, belts, tunics, etc.) are lacking. Use of insignia seems consistent with modern usage 46 . Similarly, the naval stratagems (2.9.9; 4.7.12, 23) are not really so problematic as they would appear, since ancient warships did fly flags indicating the state or at least the fleet to which they belonged 47 . We must assume, however, that use of the enemy's ships in these stratagems includes use of the enemy's flag, for which 4. 
2.4.6:
At the battle of Aquae Sextiae Marius planned to send a detachment of regular cavalry and infantry to create the illusion of a large force approaching in the enemy rear. To increase the size of this detachment, he ordered agasones (grooms) and lixae to be armed and pack-animals to be equipped as cavalry horses. The detachment was to make its appearance as soon as they heard the sounds of battle. 102 B. C.
2.4.20:
When Atheas, a Scythian king, was outnumbered in a struggle with the Triballi, he commanded women, children, and all noncombatants in the population to drive up herds of asses and cattle in the enemy rear and a group holding spears aloft to procede them. In addition, he circulated a rumor that he expected reenforcements. The Triballi withdrew. Date unknown.
3.2.3:
Hannibal seized many Italian towns by sending ahead some of his own men dressed as Romans and speaking Latin. In the period 217-203 B. C.
3.2.7;
Since the women of an Arcadian town customarily strolled in large numbers outside the walls on a certain holiday, Epaminondas disguised some of his soldiers as women, who mingled in the crowd, gained admittence to the city at dusk, and opened the gates to Epaminondas' forces. 379 B. C.
3.2.8:
Aristippus the Spartan, while the population of Tegea celebrated a sacrifice outside their walls, sent to the city a mule-train loaded with grain and driven by soldiers disguised as traders, who seized the gates for the Spartans. Date unknown.
3.2.9:
When Antiochus besieged Cappadocian Suenda, he captured and killed a party dispatched to procure grain for the city. His own soldiers assumed the dress of the Cappadocian calones (soldiers' servants), returned to Suenda with the grain, and fooled the city's guard. Date unknown.
3.2.10:
After the Thebans had failed to capture the harbor of Sicyon by force, they dispatched a merchant vessel filled with soldiers to the harbor. A few of them disguised as traders and unarmed disembarked. According to the plan they started a fight with some other Thebans at a spot remote from the sea. When the enemy's attention was diverted to this altercation, the Thebans captured the harbor and the city without opposition. 369 B. C.
3.3.6:
When Hannibal was trying to take Tarentum, he persuaded Cononesus to turn traitor. Cononesus was to go out hunting at night, an activity which was supposedly prevented by day, and Hannibal would supply him with boars. After Cononesus' successful repetition of this act, Hannibal disguised some of his soldiers as hunters, who were admitted into the city as Cononesus' attendants, killed the guards, and opened the gates. 212 B. C.
4.7.33:
Sempronius Gracchus was routed in a battle with the Voccaei, when he attacked their ring of carts apparently occupied by their women, but in reality their best warriors in women's dress. At some point 179-178 B. C.
The stratagems under this heading fall into three categories: first, use of one's civilians to pose as one's own soldiers (2.1. 6, 4.6,20) ; second, disguising one's own soldiers as one 's civilians (4.7.33) ; third, dressing one's own soldiers as the enemy 's civilians (3.2.3,7-10, 3.6) . Legal analysis of these anecdotes must be based on two principles: 18 do individuals in disguise participate in combat and do they merit consideration as a legaily defined enemy (iustus bostis) who can claim status as a prisoner of war, if captured, rather than treatment as a spy, saboteur, or outlaw? Only 2. 4.6 and 4.7.33 of slave and free, not recognized by modern international law, can have no bearing on the question. A modern provision states that those accompanying the armed forces without belonging to them, such as supply contractors and members of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, merit prisoner of war status. This cannot apply to the lixae, since in one case (2.1.6) they participate in hostile operations posing as soldiers and in another (2.4.6) they appear in combat, situations which this provision was not intended to cover 54 .
The problem can be reduced to the question whether the agasones, lixae, and calones satisfy the modern criteria of an enemy/soldier. We have the most evidence about the calones. According to Vegetius (3.6) the calones were brigaded into units of 200 packhorses and pueri (probably identical with the agasones) under their own officers and possessed their own banners (vexilla) for the various units composing the baggagetrain (impedimenta). Vegetius also notes their Late Roman designation as galiarii indicating use of a helmet 55 . Although Roman gravestones from the middle Danubian provinces always portray soldiers' servants bareheaded and wearing nondescript tunics and interpretation of the figures as calones rather than agasones is moot, helmeted calones are known from gravestones elsewhere 56 . Furthermore, we know calones were armed with cudgels (fustes) 57 .
The lixae are more problematic. Both Festus and an entry in the Suda note their unsavory reputation and deny their formal attachment to the Roman army. Vegetius, however, attests their assignment with calones to the galiarii as well as the requirement that like the regular cavalry and infantry they must learn to swim, and epigraphical evidence suggests lixae could be formally attached to specific units. In fact Frontinus' examples of the use of lixae in military operations find parallels in other sources 58 .
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Thus it seems that the agasones, lixae, and calones merit the status of soldiers/enemies, since they belong to definite units, have officers, wear a type of uniform (the calones and lixae in the Late Roman period apparently were distinguished by helmets), and the calones at least normally bore arms openly and the agasones and lixae certainly do in 2. 4.6. We can now proceed to analyze the stratagems under this heading. 7-8,10, 3.6) or calones (3.2.9) . If captured by the enemy, all these individuals could be executed as spies, but espionage and treachery of this sort are perfectly legitimate parts of the game. 2.4.20 presents the problem of certain use of noncombatants (women, boys, and all others not in service) in hostile operations, but creating an illusion of «enforcements is not entering combat and therefore not illegal. If any of them were captured, however, and a state of levee en masse or their accordance with the requirements for a soldier was not recognized, they would not merit treatment as prisoners of war.
Feigning Surrender/Desertion 2.5.27: Before the battle of Cannae began, Hannibal ordered 600 Numidian horsemen to desert to the Romans. They voluntarily handed over their swords and shields and were sent to the rear, where as soon as the fighting started they drew short swords which had been concealed in their tunics, and attacked the Romans from behind. 216 B. C.
2.5.28:
The Iapydes surrendered some rustics (pagani) to the proconsul Publius Licinius. After these were stationed behind the Roman battleline, they attacked their captors. Date unknown.
3.16.2:
Since his Gallic allies were frequently deserting to the Romans and fighting for them against the Carthaginians, Hamilcar arranged for his most loyal Gauls to desert and then to slay their Roman hosts. Thereafter the Romans refused to receive Gallic deserters. Date unknown.
All three stratagems as breaches of surrender terms or the pledged loyalty of deserters to their hosts unquestionably involve violations 60 .
Feigning Illness
2.11.2:
Pompey suspected the Chaucensians of disloyalty and feared that they would not accept a Roman garrison in their town. So he requested that they admit some of his sick troops for convalescence. Pompey arranged for his strongest men to simulate illness and the town was seized. Date unknown.
The illegality of this stratagem appears moot. Greenspan argues simulation of death, wounds, or illness is a war crime falling under the prohibition of killing or wounding treacherously, while Fleck believes simulation of death is not necessarily a perfidious act 61 . We do not know from Frontinus' account that the false invalids killed or wounded anyone and betrayals are legitimate behavior. Pompey's »sick« soldiers are neither false deserters nor prisoners of war who have surrendered. Moreover, it seems a state of war does not yet exist between the Chaucensians and the Romans. Although some commentators might argue that the stratagem is illegal since it plays upon the humanitarian concern for care of the sick, the more obvious violation is Pompey's perpetration of a hostile act without a declaration of war.
Drugs, Poison, Assassination 2.5.12:The Carthaginians dispatched Maharbal to suppress some African rebels. Since he knew the Africans had a weakness for wine, he mixed a large quantity of wine with mandragora, a drug with the properties of both poison and a soporific. Later he permitted the Africans to win in a light skirmish and that night he abandoned his camp leaving behind the drugged wine and some baggage. The Africans then seized the camp, drank themselves into a stupor, and became an easy prey for Maharbal upon his sudden return. Date unknown.
2.5.30:
Lucullus had repeatedly defeated Mithridates in battle, so Mithridates decided to try a different approach. He hired Adathas to desert to the Romans, to win their confidence, and then, when an opportunity was offered, to assassinate Lucullus. Adathas was received by the Romans, but never gained the chance to carry out his mission and returned to Mithridates. 72 B. C.
3.7.6:
When the town of Crisa was under siege, Cleisthenes of Sicyon cut off the aquaducts. Later, when the Crisaeans were desperate from thirst, he restored their water supply now tainted with hellebore. Cleisthenes was thus able to capture the town beset by diarrhoea. At some point 595-585 B. C. 4.7.10: Hannibal urged that in naval battles Antiochus III should throw jars filled with vipers onto the enemy ships to disrupt the functioning of their crews. At some point 196-190 B. C.
4.7.11:
Prusias of Bithynia used this same stratagem of snakes, when his fleet was about to yield in battle. 184 B. C.
The use of poisonous snakes (4.7.10-11) Much the same applies to 3. 7.6 : to cut off the water supply was permissible, but contamination of the water was not 64 .
Destruction of Cultural Property
3.2.5:
The Athenian Cimon captured a town in Caria without a fight, when he set fire to a sacred temple and grove by night and thus elicited the townspeople to come outside their walls to extinguish the blaze, c. 470 B. C.
This stratagem violates the rule that religious property is immune from destruction unless employed for hostile purposes 65 . 67 . Another obvious breach is using prisoners as screens against hostile fire
Misuse of Prisoners of
(1. 4.1 -2) , since prisoners cannot be employed to render a combat zone immune and must be evacuated 68 . The rather well-known morale booster of breaks the rule of the humane treatment of prisoners and the demand that they be protected from intimidation, insults, and public curiosity 69 . Likewise, Pelopidas ' elaborate ruse (3.8.2) would appear to violate the ban on use of prisoners in their captor's armed forces, even if it is voluntary service 70 . Finally, 3.15.4 and 3.16.4 both relate the mutilation of prisoners as punishment -without doubt a war crime 71 -but we should note that these two acts fall within the narrative of the anecdotes without being part of the stratagem per se. IV This paper has posed the question of the continuity of ancient and modern practice in the conduct of war. As a test case, the use of stratagems in antiquity, as collected by Frontinus, has been analyzed by the criterion of the modern laws of war, as presented in a national military field manual currently in use. Only fifty-nine of Frontinus' 484 stratagems or 12.2% aroused suspicion of illegality. Analysis of these fifty-nine has yielded the following results: seventeen proved to be permissible ruses 75 and six anecdotes contained violations which were not integral components of the stratagems 76 .
Thus Frontinus' Strategemata includes only forty-three anecdotes or 8.9% involving breaches of the modern laws of war and only thirty-seven illegal stratagems or 7.6% 77 .
From the opposite point of view it can be asserted that 91.1% of the military actions in Frontinus are legitimate today. Therefore, Fleck's statement 78 , that ancient stratagems ignored legal and ethical considerations, and its implication of a wide gap between ancient and modern rules of war rest upon a totally false impression of the ancient conduct of war and the extent to which modern rules exhibit change. To say the least, the proponents of the school of continuity between ancient and modern warfare will no doubt feel a smug confirmation of their subjective interpretations, although this study represents an isolated attempt to prove continuity objectively. In contrast, those of the school of change may be greatly surprised, if not shocked, to find so little »progress« demonstrable. It cannot be argued, however, that the evidence has been stacked one way or another. Frontinus wrote at the end of the first century and collected anecdotes of events whose dates range from the sixth century B. C. to his own time. He intended to instruct by those examples most illustrative of particular incidents drawn from history and to present solutions for similar situations which could happen again (Strut. 1 praef. 1). There can be no doubt that the Strategemata represents a fair sample of the available evidence.
On the other hand, by avoiding the difference in technology some will no doubt say that we have by-passed key factors, such as modern warfare's greater destructive power and the immense difference in the scale of operations and the number of people involved. Differences in levels of destructive power and numbers cannot be denied. But even so, this study demonstrates that the basic rules of the game have changed little in 2000 years. Certainly some alterations of the rules have occurred: pillaging, sacking captured towns, wanton destruction, enslavement of defeated populations, mutilation and torture of prisoners, and use of weapons causing unnecessary suffering, to list only a few, no longer can legitimately occur.
It should be realized, however, that the thrust of changes in the laws of war has chiefly emphasized humanitarian concerns and reduction of war's ferocity. With few exceptions written rules limiting the means of violence and controlling maneuvers to put that violence in use, i. e., rules governing operations by the armed forces of one party in conflict with the armed forces of another party, have not changed. Again, this study illustrates the point: only fifty-nine of Frontinus' 484 stratagems even aroused suspicion of violation, thus leaving 425 or 87.5% as unquestionably legitimate acts of war. In contrast, forty-three of those fifty-nine or 73% were judged illegal by modern standards. Examination of those forty-three will show them chiefly to involve humanitarian considerations. The continuity of rules governing intensity and especially trickery is confirmed by Frontinus' 91 .1% rate of modern legitimacy.
At no point in the history of Western warfare and Western international law has the employment of stratagems been illegal. Bad faith and treachery in agreements were condemned in antiquity, just as they are today 79 . But even Frontinus did not view all stratagems permissible: he considered assassination and certain cases of betrayal war crimes 80 . The real differences between ancient and modern rules of warfare (apart from the modern emphasis on humanitarian considerations) lie in written rather than unwritten international law and perhaps also in the greater effectiveness of modern public opinion in compelling compliance, for observance and enforcement of international law depend upon the voluntary will and attitude of the parties involved. The Iranian hostage crisis of 1980-81 demonstrated quite strikingly the impotence of enforcement of international law. International tribunals to enforce laws of war and to punish war crimes cannot be counted on in the future, since the trials of Nuremburg and Tokyo after World War II represent unique events spurred on by an intense unity of world opinion, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 stipulate only the use of national tribunals for judging war crimes 81 . The expediency of the unwritten warrior code and the levels of expectation between two parties in conflict remain the most essential controls on the degree of intensity and trickery in warfare. New stricter definitions of ruse and perfidy 82 , although meritorious in theory, will probably be ignored and unenforceable in practice.
Technology aside, if 91.1% of Frontinus' stratagems relate permissible military behavior by modern standards, the continuity of rules between antiquity and today for the conduct of war cannot be seriously questioned. Moreover, the rejection of the study of ancient military history by military writers of the nineteenth century, such as Clausewitz and Hamley 83 , and the attitude in some circles that ancient studies can no longer be relevant seem too extreme. The lessons of history cannot be limited to a post-Napoleonic or even a post-World-War II perspective, and students of ancient warfare should not feel themselves cut off in a discipline strictly academic and of no immediate consequence " 4 . The contemporary ancient military historian need not follow Polybius' dictum (12.25g .l) of being a general and politician before attempting the historian's craft, but pragmatike historia is still possible -nothing inherent in the sources forbids it -if practitioners will open their eyes to its possibilities 85 .
Vorbemerkung: Die hochgestellten Ziffern bei den Titeln bedeuten l.,2.,3. usw. 
